The war of misjudgement: Lu Ruquan on the U.S., Israel, and Iran conflict
China National Petroleum Corporation Research Chief says wars are rarely as controllable as their architects imagine; resilience often matters more than initial shock.
The following analysis is authored by Dr. Lu Ruquan, President of the Economics & Technology Research Institute at China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC ETRI), an elite, nationally recognized think tank dedicated to energy.
The essay's core argument is that all three parties, the U.S., Israel, and Iran, have misjudged the war's trajectory. It treats the conflict as a war of misjudgement that is drifting towards attrition, shaped less by battlefield tactics than by political endurance, alliance frictions, energy chokepoints, and the failure of regime-change assumptions.
Key takeaways include:
The "Triple Misjudgement" Framework: Dr. Lu notes that the U.S., Israel, and Iran are trapped in a protracted war of attrition due to strategic misjudgments on all sides. In analyzing the U.S. position, he highlights a severe strategic overextension: he assesses that American forces entered the conflict logistically under-prepared (citing figures like 50,000 regional troops and only 7–10 days of high-intensity munitions) and hampered by contradictory political objectives across Washington's agencies.
The Resilience of a "Civilizational State": Dr. Lu contrasts Iran with the "artificial states" of the Middle East (whose borders were largely drawn by the Sykes-Picot Agreement). He argues that Iran's deep-rooted identity as a "civilizational state" naturally triggers intense national cohesion when faced with foreign attacks. From his perspective, Western assumptions that external military pressure would spark an internal opposition uprising fundamentally misread this inherent historical and demographic resilience.
Modeling Extreme Energy Shocks via the Strait of Hormuz: Dr. Lu identifies the Strait of Hormuz as the ultimate center of gravity in this conflict. He models a viable scenario where the Strait remains blockaded for three to six months, effectively weaponizing inflation against the West. By noting that Brent crude could plausibly shatter the $150 to $200 per barrel mark under these conditions, he outlines a stark, worst-case scenario of how geopolitical chokepoints could dictate the outcome of modern asymmetric warfare.
U.S. Domestic Politics as the Ultimate "Exit Mechanism": The analysis concludes that the war is unlikely to end via a decisive military victory. Instead, Dr. Lu argues it will conclude only when the economic pain becomes politically unbearable for the U.S.. He links the battlefield timeline to U.S. electoral cycles, projecting that if extreme oil prices persist for over three months, it could inflict lethal damage on the incumbent administration's midterm election prospects. Thus, Washington's political tolerance for economic blowback will ultimately serve as the war's exit mechanism.
Dr. Lu has kindly authorized your host to translate the piece, please find the full English version below.
The U.S., Israel, and Iran have all misjudged the trajectory of the war
其实，美国、以色列和伊朗都误判了这场战争的走向！
The conflict between the U.S., Israel, and Iran has entered its fourth week, spilling over into at least 12 countries and sending economic and political shockwaves across the globe. To date, none of the belligerents have achieved their strategic objectives, yet all claim they can outlast their opponents.
Although the conflict is less than a month old—and compared to the "tug-of-war," "war of attrition," and "protracted war" seen in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it seems to have just begun—both sides appear to have miscalculated each other's reactions. This has led to continuous escalation with no clear way out in the foreseeable future.
If the conflict devolves into a protracted war of attrition, Russia's passive strategic position will significantly improve. Through soaring oil and gas prices and rapidly increasing export volumes, Russia's petroleum revenues will rise substantially, granting it greater strategic initiative on the Ukrainian battlefield.
Meanwhile, Western economies, Gulf states, and major Asian energy importers like China, India, Japan, and South Korea are already feeling the pain caused by the war's escalation and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. In fact, Iran blocked the Strait at the very onset of the war, disrupting approximately one-third of the world's crude oil and one-quarter of its LNG shipments. Brent crude futures for May delivery have remained above $100 over the past week, while Dubai and Oman crude—benchmarks for the Asian market—have soared to an exorbitant $150 per barrel.
The person feeling most discouraged right now is likely Donald Trump. He originally envisioned that the February 28 "decapitation strike" against the Iranian leadership—including the targeted elimination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—would trigger the collapse of the Iranian regime. He hoped to replicate the "Venezuela Model" (the precise capture of Maduro) and experience the feeling of "winning big" once again in Iran.
However, this vision has yet to materialize. Khamenei's hardline son, Mojtaba Khamenei, has taken the reins and vowed revenge. To date, no domestic rebellion challenging the regime has emerged, and the "internal-external coordination" by the Iranian opposition that the West had hoped for has failed to appear.
Despite suffering massive airstrikes, Iran has retained its capability to launch ballistic missiles and drones at U.S. military bases across the Middle East, Israel, and crucially, major cities in U.S. partner nations in the Gulf.
It is safe to say that all three parties—the U.S., Israel, and Iran—have made severe miscalculations regarding this war. Instead of concluding swiftly as all sides desired, the war has descended into a more complex stalemate in its fourth week, bringing far greater global shocks than anticipated.
For the United States, it underestimated Iran's resilience and overestimated its own ability to control events.
First, Trump firmly believed he could win this war quickly and at a low cost, akin to previous military interventions aimed at regime change through a swift "blitz." Furthermore, U.S. pre-war preparation was glaringly inadequate. With only about 50,000 troops deployed in the Middle East and reserves of high-intensity munitions sufficient for only 7–10 days, the U.S. was entirely unprepared for a protracted war.
Second, Trump severely underestimated the survivability and willpower of the Iranian regime. Despite the successful "decapitation" strike early in the war, Iran did not collapse. Instead, it rapidly activated a "mosaic defense," decentralizing command and launching a fiercely unexpected counterattack.
Moreover, the Iranian public did not stage the anticipated "uprising." Unlike many artificially created states in the Middle East (whose modern borders were largely drawn in secret by British and French diplomats Sykes and Picot), Iran is a "civilizational state." When faced with foreign invasion, Iranian national identity and pride are naturally awakened. With Shia Muslims comprising roughly 90% of the population, their sense of identity and cohesion is extraordinarily strong.
Third, Trump's political objectives in this war have been muddled. Washington has oscillated between "regime change" and "merely degrading military capabilities," with contradictory statements emerging from the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon. "Besides Trump, no one in the White House right now knows exactly what Trump is thinking," commented an expert from a Washington think tank. Trump completely failed to anticipate that Iran would directly blockade the Strait of Hormuz, disrupting roughly 35% of global oil shipments, triggering a global energy crisis and inflation, and ultimately backfiring on the U.S. economy and domestic politics.
For Israel, it overestimated the strategic window and underestimated the limits of its ally's tolerance.
First, Israel assumed that the collapse of the "Axis of Resistance" and Russia being bogged down in Ukraine meant Iran was absolutely isolated and unable to fight back. In reality, once Iran shifted to homeland defense, its combat capabilities far exceeded expectations. Underpinning this is the fact that Iran has largely achieved industrialization through decades of a "resistance economy." It is the only Middle Eastern nation with a comprehensive industrial system—albeit one characterized by "low-level, low-cost, and even low-quality" manufacturing. However, this does not hinder Iran from continuously churning out ballistic missiles and drones.
Second, Israel assumed the U.S. would show unlimited tolerance for its actions. This was Israel's most severe miscalculation. Israel believed the U.S. would unconditionally support any of its military actions. But when Israel insisted on striking Iranian energy facilities and sent oil prices to spiral out of control, the rift between the U.S. and Israel immediately became public. Trump openly said he had not been informed and did not like such actions, shattering Israel's traditional security assumptions.
Third, there is a vast difference in how the U.S. and Israel perceive this conflict. Israel's "maximalist" goal (completely destroying the current Iranian regime) fundamentally conflicts with the U.S.'s "limited war" objective (avoiding the quagmire of an Iranian war and refusing to deploy ground troops on Iranian soil). As the war drags on, voices within the U.S. labeling this "Israel's war" are growing louder, shaking the foundation of U.S. strategic support.
For Iran, it has probably overestimated the deterrence of the Strait of Hormuz and underestimated its opponents' resolve.
First, Iran's attempt to use the closure of the Strait of Hormuz as leverage may yet backfire.Tehran believed blockading the Strait of Hormuz was its trump card to force the international community to pressure the U.S. and Israel. While this move did batter the global economy and compel Trump to seek a quick end to the war for midterm election votes, it paradoxically hardened America's resolve for a direct military solution.
Second, Iran's strategy of "strategic patience" has failed. For a long time, Iran utilized "strategic patience" to avoid direct conflict with the U.S. and Israel (e.g., its restrained response following Qasem Soleimani's assassination) in an attempt to buy survival space. However, this was interpreted by the U.S. and Israel as "weakness," ultimately culminating in the full-scale military strike on February 28.
Third, If the U.S. successfully organizes an escort coalition in the Strait of Hormuz, Iran's strategic passivity will become increasingly evident. Iran underestimated the solidarity of Western nations (such as the UK, France, Germany, Japan, and South Korea) in jointly condemning the attacks and forming a united escort fleet after facing direct assaults. Of course, the effectiveness of this coalition remains to be seen; if Iran's countermeasures are suppressed, the regime's future will be bleak.
This war has made one thing clear: the U.S. misjudged the controllability of the "war switch," plunging into an unwanted war of attrition. Israel misjudged the "margin of error" in the U.S.-Israel relationship, creating a strategic rift with its ally at a critical moment. And Iran, attempting to "hold the world hostage via the Strait of Hormuz," ultimately burned itself.
At this point, we must ask: What is the direction of this war? Will the Strait of Hormuz be blocked long-term (more than three months)?
Given all factors, the war is unlikely to end within the "four weeks" Trump previously boasted. Due to Iran's unexpectedly resilient fighting, the conflict is shifting toward a "protracted war" and a "war of attrition." Consequently, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is unlikely to be lifted within three months. The core question is no longer if there will be a long-term blockade, but how long it will last and who can hold out the longest.
A blockade lasting over three months is entirely possible. The primary reason is that major economies heavily reliant on Gulf crude oil imports, mainly Asian countries, have significantly bolstered their strategic petroleum reserves over the past few years. They can weather the "extreme" scenario of a blockade lasting three months or longer. Japan, for instance, has enough strategic reserves to cover 254 days of consumption. India and Southeast Asian nations have more limited reserves, but recent developments show they have secured waivers to resume purchasing Russian oil (which has been under U.S. and European sanctions). In short, within a three-month window, outside nations do not yet possess the absolute, desperate resolve needed to mediate the Strait of Hormuz crisis.
Furthermore, several other factors suggest the blockade could become a long-term reality:
First, Internal assessments by U.S. intelligence, including a recent Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report, conclude that Iran has the capability to blockade the strait for 1 to 6 months. Although the White House has publicly downplayed the extreme "6-month" scenario, private intelligence analyses confirm Iran possesses the hard power for such a prolonged blockade.
Second, the U.S. military faces practical operational difficulties. The Strait of Hormuz is nearly 100 miles long, and Iran controls a vast northern coastline from which it can launch attacks at any point, making full-spectrum defense extremely difficult for the U.S. military. While Iran's formal navy has suffered heavy losses, it still retains numerous small speedboats, frogmen, and even jet skis capable of launching suicide attacks or laying mines. Safely escorting a single oil tanker might require multiple U.S. destroyers, making the cost astronomically high.
Third, the blockade is Iran's primary leverage to "bog down the U.S." Iran's strategic goal is clear: use the blockade to drive up oil prices, exert pressure on the U.S. domestic economy and midterm elections, and force Trump back to the negotiating table. As long as U.S. and Israeli military strikes continue, Iran has no incentive to give up this trump card.
Fourth, the chances of a quick resumption of shipping are slim. As of March 21, very few ships, at most 10, have dared to "force their way" through the strait. Even if the U.S. and Israel continue to bomb Iranian energy facilities (like Kharg Island), they cannot completely eradicate Iran's coastal harassment capabilities in the short term. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has frankly admitted there is "no clear solution" to the strait issue.
It appears that whoever controls the Strait of Hormuz holds the decisive marker for victory. Iran is employing a stalling strategy, using the blockade and asymmetric warfare to drag the U.S. and Israel into a high-attrition quagmire, attempting to exhaust their will to fight. Strategic divergences between the U.S. and Israel are widening: Israel continues to pursue the "elimination of the Iranian regime," while the U.S. prefers "limited strikes on nuclear facilities" followed by a quick exit to avoid domestic political blowback from high oil prices.
The longer the strait remains closed, the higher international oil prices will soar. Seeing Brent crude break $150 or even $200 per barrel may become a once-in-a-lifetime reality. These sustained high oil prices are devouring Trump's midterm election prospects. Experts point out that if high oil prices persist for over three months, the probability of Trump losing the midterm elections exceeds 70%.
The outcome of this war will likely not be the total annihilation of one side by the other. Instead, it will depend on when the U.S., facing domestic political pressures (oil prices, anti-war sentiments), is the first to establish an "exit mechanism." As Ray Dalio, founder of Bridgewater Associates, commented on this war: "In war, one's ability to withstand pain is even more important than one's ability to inflict pain."
Currently, whether the U.S. can bear the political and economic costs, whether Israel can endure a long-term war of attrition, and whether Iran can survive the destruction of nearly all its military and state apparatus—all three parties are facing a severe test in this "war of miscalculations."