The PKU scholar argues that Manila exaggerates the intensity of China-U.S. rivalry, while Tokyo sees U.S. retrenchment as an opportunity to expand its strategic role.
And what if the Philippines has not misjudged China at all—and China has misjudged the Philippines?
Hu Bo argues that Manila is overestimating U.S. support and underestimating the enormous maritime power gap between China and the Philippines. I think this gets the problem backwards.
The Philippines knows perfectly well that it cannot change the maritime balance of power by itself. Its political and security establishment also understands that Washington has little desire to fight a major war with China over every Philippine maritime confrontation.
Yet Manila keeps pushing.
That makes sense if confrontation itself generates political returns. The Philippines does not need to defeat China. It only needs to keep China occupied, internationalize every maritime incident, deepen U.S.-Philippine military integration and continuously raise the political cost of Chinese control in the South China Sea.
For parts of the Philippine political and security elite, the value of the Philippines to Washington is precisely its ability to constrain China. Their institutional incentives, alliance relationships and political careers do not necessarily map perfectly onto the long-term national interest of the Philippines.
This is why assuming that Manila is simply “miscalculating” may itself be dangerous.
China may believe that demonstrating overwhelming superiority will eventually convince the Philippines to stop. But what if Philippine strategy does not depend on winning?
Every additional Chinese coast-guard deployment, every larger confrontation and every diplomatic crisis can also strengthen the argument for more U.S. access, more military cooperation and deeper Philippine dependence on Washington.
The Philippines may understand China's restraint and China's superiority perfectly well.
The real miscalculation would be for Beijing to assume that a weaker opponent must eventually behave like a weaker opponent.
What if Japan has not misjudged China—and China is misjudging Japan?
Hu Bo argues that Tokyo risks interpreting China's restraint as weakness: Japan keeps pushing boundaries because it underestimates China's willingness or ability to escalate.
I think the opposite possibility deserves much more attention.
Japan knows China can escalate. It also knows Beijing has powerful reasons to avoid allowing individual maritime incidents to become uncontrolled military crises.
That predictability may be precisely what makes incremental Japanese risk-taking attractive.
Japan has spent more than a decade gradually loosening the military constraints created by the postwar order: collective self-defense, rapidly rising defense spending, long-range stand-off weapons, counterstrike capabilities and a much stronger military posture around the southwestern islands.
Every new confrontation with China makes the next step easier to justify domestically.
Japan therefore does not necessarily need China to remain completely passive. It needs China to react—but in a controlled way.
A sufficiently visible Chinese response strengthens the political case for military normalization. A war would be catastrophic. But persistent, manageable tension can help Japan expand capabilities that would have been politically much harder to justify under a permanently peaceful regional environment.
This is why describing Japanese behavior as a “misjudgment” may miss the incentive entirely.
Japan may be using Sino-American rivalry to remove, step by step, the institutional constraints placed on Japanese military power after 1945. In the short term this strengthens the U.S.-Japan alliance. Over the longer term, it also gives Japan substantially greater strategic autonomy.
Japan may therefore need a crisis more than it needs a victory.
If Beijing assumes that demonstrating greater military power will eventually make Tokyo retreat, China may be reading the game incorrectly.
Japan may not have misjudged China's restraint. It may be counting on it—and hoping that China misjudges what Japan ultimately wants.
The real question is not whether Tokyo and Manila benefit from tension. In some respects they clearly do. The harder question is whether the benefits they seek are proportionate to the escalation risks they are assuming, and whether they correctly understand where China’s actual thresholds lie.
And what if the Philippines has not misjudged China at all—and China has misjudged the Philippines?
Hu Bo argues that Manila is overestimating U.S. support and underestimating the enormous maritime power gap between China and the Philippines. I think this gets the problem backwards.
The Philippines knows perfectly well that it cannot change the maritime balance of power by itself. Its political and security establishment also understands that Washington has little desire to fight a major war with China over every Philippine maritime confrontation.
Yet Manila keeps pushing.
That makes sense if confrontation itself generates political returns. The Philippines does not need to defeat China. It only needs to keep China occupied, internationalize every maritime incident, deepen U.S.-Philippine military integration and continuously raise the political cost of Chinese control in the South China Sea.
For parts of the Philippine political and security elite, the value of the Philippines to Washington is precisely its ability to constrain China. Their institutional incentives, alliance relationships and political careers do not necessarily map perfectly onto the long-term national interest of the Philippines.
This is why assuming that Manila is simply “miscalculating” may itself be dangerous.
China may believe that demonstrating overwhelming superiority will eventually convince the Philippines to stop. But what if Philippine strategy does not depend on winning?
Every additional Chinese coast-guard deployment, every larger confrontation and every diplomatic crisis can also strengthen the argument for more U.S. access, more military cooperation and deeper Philippine dependence on Washington.
The Philippines may understand China's restraint and China's superiority perfectly well.
The real miscalculation would be for Beijing to assume that a weaker opponent must eventually behave like a weaker opponent.
What if Japan has not misjudged China—and China is misjudging Japan?
Hu Bo argues that Tokyo risks interpreting China's restraint as weakness: Japan keeps pushing boundaries because it underestimates China's willingness or ability to escalate.
I think the opposite possibility deserves much more attention.
Japan knows China can escalate. It also knows Beijing has powerful reasons to avoid allowing individual maritime incidents to become uncontrolled military crises.
That predictability may be precisely what makes incremental Japanese risk-taking attractive.
Japan has spent more than a decade gradually loosening the military constraints created by the postwar order: collective self-defense, rapidly rising defense spending, long-range stand-off weapons, counterstrike capabilities and a much stronger military posture around the southwestern islands.
Every new confrontation with China makes the next step easier to justify domestically.
Japan therefore does not necessarily need China to remain completely passive. It needs China to react—but in a controlled way.
A sufficiently visible Chinese response strengthens the political case for military normalization. A war would be catastrophic. But persistent, manageable tension can help Japan expand capabilities that would have been politically much harder to justify under a permanently peaceful regional environment.
This is why describing Japanese behavior as a “misjudgment” may miss the incentive entirely.
Japan may be using Sino-American rivalry to remove, step by step, the institutional constraints placed on Japanese military power after 1945. In the short term this strengthens the U.S.-Japan alliance. Over the longer term, it also gives Japan substantially greater strategic autonomy.
Japan may therefore need a crisis more than it needs a victory.
If Beijing assumes that demonstrating greater military power will eventually make Tokyo retreat, China may be reading the game incorrectly.
Japan may not have misjudged China's restraint. It may be counting on it—and hoping that China misjudges what Japan ultimately wants.
The real question is not whether Tokyo and Manila benefit from tension. In some respects they clearly do. The harder question is whether the benefits they seek are proportionate to the escalation risks they are assuming, and whether they correctly understand where China’s actual thresholds lie.