Former senior energy official calls for deeper market reform in China's new energy sector
Dr. Yang Lei, now deputy dean of Peking University's Institute of Energy, notes the market's key role in the new energy sector and urges solutions to overcapacity, pricing, and infrastructure issues.
China's new energy sector has seen explosive growth over the past decade, but this rapid expansion is not without risks. In 2024, eight major PV firms listed on the A-share market collectively lost RMB 37 billion (roughly USD 5 billion), highlighting the persistent challenges of overcapacity and price wars, according to Caijing Magazine, a Chinese business media outlet.
Today's newsletter features an interview with Dr. Yang Lei (杨雷), Deputy Dean of Peking University's Institute of Energy, conducted by Caijing Magazine.
Dr. Yang served as the Deputy Director-General of the Oil and Gas Department at China's National Energy Administration from 2012 to 2016 and as a Senior Advisor to the Executive Director Fatih BIROL of the International Energy Agency from 2016 to 2019, before he joined Peking University in 2020.
Dr. Yang has been involved in drafting China's key energy and oil & gas development plans, including China's 11th, 12th, and 13th Five-Year Plans (2006-2020). His research has largely focused on energy transformation, especially in distributed energy, which has been a buzzword in the central policy language in recent years.
In the interview, Dr. Yang noted while China's manufacturing capacity in the new energy sector is now strong, the pressing issue is how to absorb this production capacity. During the 2012-2013 EU and US "anti-dumping and anti-subsidy" measures, China's photovoltaic industry was almost brought to its knees. It was only through domestic demand that the industry managed to overcome that crisis. Today, to get out of a similar predicament, the photovoltaic industry needs to stimulate further domestic demand.
This brings us to the key point Dr. Yang emphasized throughout the interview—"market." He believes that China's energy sector must accelerate its marketization process, making significant strides in price mechanisms and market system development.
Furthermore, Dr. Yang argues that although the Trump administration withdrew from the Paris Agreement again, its core energy policy—deregulation and accelerating market development—has inadvertently supported the growth of renewable energy. Meanwhile, China and Europe share greater consensus on climate issues. With the pressure from the US, now is the perfect time for China and Europe to strengthen their cooperation on energy and climate change.
对话杨雷：新能源产业中国做对了什么，还应做什么？
Interview with Yang Lei: What Has China Got Right in the New Energy Industry, and What Should It Do Next?
I. Four Key Factors Behind the Rise of China's New Energy Industry
Caijing: In terms of production capacity and installed volume, China's new energy industry is now far ahead as the world leader. Looking back over the past decade, what do you think China has done right?
Yang Lei: First and foremost, we put our trust in the market. The leading companies in wind power, photovoltaics, and electric vehicles are predominantly private enterprises, and they are also the main drivers of innovation in the sector.
Secondly, the role of policy. From "Document No. 5" in 2002 (Notice on the Power System Reform issued by the State Council), to the "Document No. 9" in 2015 (Guidance for Further Deepening Power System Reform issued by CPC Central Committee and the State Council), and more recently, the incremental distribution network reforms and the development of the spot power market, the Chinese government has consistently pushed market-oriented reforms in the energy sector.
Some may still feel such a reform has been slower than expected, but one needs to recognize that the direction of marketization has remained unchanged for over 20 years. The establishment of PipeChina is another important step toward natural gas marketization, which has progressed faster than the power sector reforms.
There is now broad consensus within the industry that, with new energy as the main focus, resource allocation should be optimized through market mechanisms. Especially since the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee emphasized that the market plays a decisive role, this policy direction has remained unchanged.
Thirdly, we have believed in technology. The driving force behind this round of industrial—or rather, energy—revolution is technology. As we often say, science and technology are the primary productive forces. Productivity has, in turn, changed the relations of production, brought about changes in business models, and pushed us into a new era.
If climate change and resource constraints constitute external pressures, then technology provides the intrinsic motivation to address them. Today, innovation and R&D are priorities at both the national and enterprise levels, and we have indeed made great achievements.
Caijing: Some international voices suggest that China's rapid development in new energy has been driven primarily by government industrial policies. Is there some truth to this?
Yang Lei: Globally, most countries have implemented various incentive policies for new energy, and there is nothing wrong with such a policy direction. China has introduced similar policies. What I want to emphasize is that technology and the market play a truly sustainable, foundational role. For example, China once promoted ethanol, but it hasn't scaled up like photovoltaics. Policies often involve trial and error, and ultimately, the market’s choice will prevail.
Industrial policy support is crucial, and the support for photovoltaics and electric vehicles has indeed accelerated the development of the sector. This has attracted a lot of international attention, and it's understandable. However, saying that China's success is solely due to industrial policy support is a somewhat one-sided view.
Caijing: China is now the world's largest new energy market, but for a long time, Europe was the biggest market, largely sustained by subsidies from EU member states. Why hasn't the EU developed a robust new energy industry, whereas we in China have?
Yang Lei: The EU's new energy sector is still very strong. For example, Germany’s share of both installed capacity and power generation from photovoltaics and wind turbines far exceeds China's. What hasn't developed in Europe is manufacturing. Following traditional principles of comparative advantage, Europe tends to buy ready-made products from China.
Why are China's photovoltaic products so cost-effective? It's because there is a huge industrial chain supporting it, from silicon refinement to processing, slicing, and assembly. This is an advantage of China's industrial foundation, and also a result of international division of labor. Europeans may think that since they do automobiles better, they should focus on cars and buy photovoltaic components from China.
However, in the wake of the pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, countries have become more concerned about supply chain risks and want to bring manufacturing back. But many countries have higher production costs, such as the U.S., where making the same photovoltaic components could cost 50% more than in China. If some countries insist on reshoring manufacturing, there are also benefits because a thriving industry relies on collective effort. China's substantial advantage means it can invest abroad or export technology directly. A lot of technologies advance through mutual learning, and cooperation is always better. As for concerns about industrial chain security, it's important to have open discussions. Simply "decoupling from China" is not a rational approach.
Caijing: Aside from market, policy, and technology, I think another key factor is entrepreneurship. Some debate which is more important - entrepreneurial vision or the so‐called engineer dividend. I think entrepreneurship matters more. Without it, the engineer dividend can't be fully realized. Taken together, these four factors explain how China's new energy industry has risen so quickly.
Yang Lei: Entrepreneurs rely on the market. The market is what lets you take risks, be a pioneer, do what others won’t, and turn the impossible into possible. Ultimately, there must be a well-functioning market to reward such actions, which then drives industry growth.
Caijing: The market and entrepreneurs share a symbiotic relationship—like fish and water. Only in water can fish swim freely.
Yang Lei: Once the water is right, the fish will naturally thrive.
II. Excessive Focus on Bottom-Line Thinking May Backfire
Caijing: In 2015, Caijing launched the column "Energy Profiles of Various Countries" to introduce international experience as a reference for China's energy transition. Now that China has become the world's largest new energy market, does that mean there's no international experience left for us to learn from?
Yang Lei: We must not be arrogant. One of the greatest virtues of Chinese culture is humility and there's still a lot we need to learn. For instance, China's market mechanisms and business models are still far from perfect, and it still lags behind in many areas of original technology. The idea that "we are now number one in the new energy sector and no longer need to learn from international experience" is a dangerous mindset. Success is not permanent - it requires continuous learning. Looking back at history, we should also remain grateful. No successful entrepreneur would claim they can achieve global leadership behind closed doors, and no country can become powerful by isolating itself.
Caijing: In the current environment, is it worth exploring the idea of achieving full industrial‐chain autonomy and self‐sufficiency?
Yang Lei: From a risk mitigation perspective, some countries might say it's unwise to completely rely on Chinese products. We also acknowledge that technological dependence is an issue. This involves cost considerations—first, we need to ask ourselves if we can produce it ourselves. If we can, then the next question is how high the cost should be to make it worthwhile. It's not just China - the Trump Administration is thinking along the same lines.
Caijing: Finding a balance between security and cost, or security and efficiency, is key.
Yang Lei: Our generation has lived in an era of peace, and our awareness of more intensified or deteriorating international situations is insufficient. Russia gives us a reference: a country that doesn't face food and energy security problems won't have survival issues. Some people ask if Russia, after such a long conflict with Ukraine, is about to collapse. It appears that, despite a decline in economic quality and living standards, they continue to operate relatively normally; as long as basic needs are met, society remains stable.
Caijing: The core is that Russia is self‐sufficient in both energy and food.
Yang Lei: In fact, human survival needs are not that many. For instance, there's a common concern that if the Strait of Malacca is at war, we won't have oil for our cars. But think about it—if such an extreme situation arises, will you still drive around? Who will you sell your products to? We absolutely need to maintain a bottom‐line mindset in critical areas, but we must not exaggerate every risk we face. I am very concerned that if this mindset spreads, we might channel huge sums into extreme countermeasures, which would introduce new economic risks. We cannot afford to let resource allocation become chronically skewed and forfeit our own capacity by preparing for every remote possibility before it even materializes.
Caijing: As mentioned earlier, we need to find a balance between security and efficiency, or security and cost. The closure of the Malacca Strait is an extremely unlikely event. If day‐to‐day operations are structured around such remote possibilities, the overall system costs would become prohibitively high.
Yang Lei: Yes, we have learned this lesson from history.
III. What Important Things Has China Not Yet Accomplished?
Caijing: We've discussed what we've done right, but on the flip side, what are the things we should have done but haven't done properly, or perhaps haven't even started?
Yang Lei: This is worth a deeper discussion. We speak of "trusting the market", but has the energy market really played a decisive role in resource allocation? Take natural gas pricing, for example. The international market does not accept China's pricing because it lacks a sufficiently mature mechanism to form market-driven prices. Much of the pricing is merely variations built upon the government-mandated standards in the past. As the world's largest natural gas importer, China still has no long-term contracts signed based on its own price index, which reflects a lack of soft power.
Therefore, we need to speed up the marketization of pricing, including business model reforms. Developed countries initiated energy market reforms much earlier, and there is much China can learn from their efforts in business-model innovation. Many of their policy tools are often quite neutral, designed to create a market that optimizes resource allocation. I've conducted extensive research on natural gas market reform and am aware that the international community has navigated these changes through trial and error, sometimes at significant social cost. China should learn from those experiences so that it doesn't have to pay the same price again.
China also has a lot to learn in the realm of fundamental innovation. Under its current research system, the biggest challenge is how to genuinely incentivize original innovation, rather than just focusing on papers and projects. With too many KPIs, we've moved further away from actual research.
Caijing: We've been discussing why there's no Chinese price for natural gas for 20 years, and this problem is still unresolved.
Yang Lei: From basic economics, the market is the best tool for optimizing resource allocation, but why is it so difficult in the energy sector? When we look at the attributes of energy commodities, are there any particularities? Energy does have some unique features, the biggest being infrastructure constraints.
For example, if you build a wind or solar power plant, but don't have the necessary power wires or grid, you can't sell the electricity. Similarly, if you develop a natural gas field, you must have pipelines in place before you can deliver and sell the gas. I was involved throughout the planning of the West–East Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline Project in China, and at that time, many were very pessimistic and conservative. Since natural gas was a new commodity, it was hard to convince others to use it, and they questioned whether they could handle that much gas and whether the price was right. Would you still want to develop the gas field or invest in constructing expensive pipelines? That hesitation was understandable.
The natural gas industry often relies on take-or-pay contracts, meaning that even if you don't need the gas, you still have to pay. Electricity, however, is a more immediate commodity. Once it's generated, it must be consumed immediately, so infrastructure requirements are even higher. Therefore, the energy industry needs a whole set of supporting facilities and regulations: whether it's electricity or natural gas, the early model everywhere was an integrated, upstream-to-downstream monopoly.
Caijing: This is the most efficient structure.
Yang Lei: Yes, but as the scale grows, it can only be managed through government-regulated pricing. Actually, more than 20 years ago, China began energy marketization reforms. For example, the separation of power generation and power grids allowed power plants to grow rapidly. Now, China is thinking about how to use the market to better promote the development of new energy. There is a general consensus on this, but policy alignment is essential for implementation.
One issue is universal service. Cross-subsidization remains a long-standing issue: prices of electricity for residential use are relatively low—could they be raised slightly? They could certainly stay low, but if so, it must be clearly identified where the subsidies will come from. Only by doing so can we cultivate a proper market. Otherwise, we'll be in a situation where we can't differentiate between market behavior and universal services.
Caijing: Enterprises should take on the market function, while universal service should be a government role. When they are mixed together, things get unclear.
Yang Lei: This situation has developed historically, and it involves both the fair division of responsibilities and execution. It also affects vested interests. China has been making reforms in this area, and I'm confident about the progress. The Institute of Energy at Peking University is conducting bottom-up reform research, including in large industrial parks, small counties, and rural areas. If an effective market can be built at the primary level, we can then push for changes in the entire system.
The previous monopoly and centralized model existed because fossil energy is inherently centralized—oil fields, coal mines, power plants—where bigger scale leads to greater efficiency, requiring this kind of structure. But now, wind and solar energy are everywhere; the very nature of energy has changed. Previously, a single power plant might generate 1 million kilowatts, whereas today, a single station could be just a few kilowatts — even households can install small-scale photovoltaic systems. When millions of these tiny stations aggregate, their combined capacity becomes staggering. Australian media reported that China now could built the equivalent of five million-kilowatt power plants per week through such aggregation. Indeed, in the energy sector, the era of the masses is coming.
This puts greater urgency on system reforms. The power grid is already struggling to absorb so much wind and solar power, and this is forcing China to accelerate changes in production relations.
Caijing: To summarize, over the past 20 years, China has solved the manufacturing issues, and going forward, it needs to address issues related to market structure, transaction mechanisms, and pricing mechanisms.
Yang Lei: China has already solved the issue of "producing well," and now the urgent task ahead is "using it well." China's photovoltaic market is currently sluggish. Why can't it scale up domestic adoption? When the EU and US conducted anti-dumping and countervailing investigations on Chinese PV manufacturers, the orders plummeted, a situation even more dire than today. Back then, China overcame it by jumpstarting the domestic market. Now the country needs to reignite that strategy, with an even larger untapped home market awaiting development.
Caijing: China once again needs to rely on domestic demand to stimulate industry vitality, but there are many bottlenecks in the way.
Yang Lei: China's market environment has improved significantly since those days. Years of developing incremental distribution networks and spot power markets have diversified market participants. Visit rural areas today, and you'll see that many rural entrepreneurs are involved in new energy. The technical barriers are falling quickly, and there's a lot of grassroots ingenuity. This demonstrates the viability of mass participation. Now the country needs to design institutional frameworks and business models capable of supporting renewable energy's next-phase expansion.
In the past, when wind and solar accounted for just 5 percent of grid‐connected generation, the grid operators complained that they could not manage it. Today, that share has risen to 20 percent. In Germany, renewables account for 72 percent of grid generation on average, most of which is wind and solar; during peak resource periods, they often supply 100 percent.
To achieve China's "dual carbon" goals of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality, non-fossil energy needs to account for more than 80%, and non-fossil energy in electricity generation needs to account for more than 90%. This demands tackling the toughest challenges - building a new power system centered on renewable energy. It's like how roads were originally designed for horse-drawn carriages, but now, with cars, roads need to be rebuilt, with traffic lights and wider lanes.
Similarly, China needs to rebuild energy infrastructure—power grids, natural gas pipelines, and heating networks. There's also the multi-purpose renovation of pipelines. For example, can pipelines that were originally for natural gas also carry hydrogen? The grid infrastructure, especially the distribution network, needs to be a top priority. Many renewable energy sources need to be consumed locally, and if the distribution grid doesn't keep up, they can't be absorbed. That’s why China needs to build a distributed smart grid.
Caijing: Originally, the grid was designed for centralized generation and long-distance transmission, so the backbone network is highly developed, while the transmission and distribution networks are relatively weak. Now that distributed energy has grown, those once-weak transmission and distribution networks appear even more inadequate.
Yang Lei: The construction of the distribution network also involves investment mechanisms. Should it only be built by state-owned enterprises, or can we have more diverse investment? How should the investment mechanism be improved in the future? These are pressing practical issues, and work is already underway to address them. If we limit investment to just a few central state-owned enterprises, resolving distribution network challenges will prove extremely difficult due to the massive capital requirements. But looking back: many seemingly intractable problems from the planned economy era were ultimately solved by harnessing market.
I can sense strong bottom-up dynamics in this round of reforms. Emerging players like virtual power plants and energy aggregators are finding growing market space. Energy storage firms also need signals on when to charge and discharge. With electric vehicles (EVs) scaling exponentially—soon vastly outperforming current storage systems—each EV essentially becomes a mobile battery. At 100 million vehicles, this fleet could store tens of billions of kWh and feed power back to the grid. Even at a conservative 10 kW slow-charging rate, 100 million EVs would provide 1,000 GW (100 million × 10 kW) of peak-shaving and backup capacity—compared to China's current total installed generation capacity of just over 3,000 GW. The challenge? Harnessing this potential. We're still figuring it out. Of course, this is an idealized scenario, and the numbers may not fully materialize, but the trend is clear.
Caijing: The EU began electricity market reforms in the 1980s, and they’ve been doing it for over 40 years. If we count from the release of "Document No. 5" in 2002 (Notice on the Power System Reform issued by the State Council), China has only been reforming the power market for about 20 years—and the achievements are already immense.
Yang Lei: That’s why we must remain confident. If there is broad consensus and collective effort, the pace of market liberalization can accelerate, and new energy will enjoy an even brighter future. During the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, new energy will play a crucial supporting role.
IV. Could Trump Actually Promote the Development of New Energy?
Caijing: After the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2015, global efforts on the energy transition and climate action have generally been heading in the right direction. However, with the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022 and Trump's return to the White House, new variables have emerged in energy transition and climate change. What are the short-term and long-term impacts of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on Europe's energy transition?
Yang Lei: The Russia-Ukraine conflict has accelerated Europe's energy transition. Prior to the conflict, about half of the EU’s fossil energy was imported from Russia. After the conflict broke out, Europe launched the REPowerEU plan, a comprehensive set of policies and action plans. This plan set an ambitious goal: to completely phase out Russian fossil energy imports by 2030 through accelerated energy transition and diversification. At first, many believed that Europe would struggle without Russian natural gas, but three years later, Europe has not collapsed. In fact, the progress in reducing dependence on Russian fossil fuels has exceeded expectations and is moving faster than planned.
Caijing: In the short term, it seems like Europe's energy transition has stagnated, or even reversed, due to increased fossil fuel usage, higher electricity and energy prices, and rising social dissatisfaction. But in the long term, these short-term challenges may accelerate its transition to renewable energy.
Yang Lei: We're already seeing signs of that in China: investment in energy-transition measures is ramping up quickly. Hydrogen strategies, for instance, are now being funded at levels we have not seen before.
Caijing: A large portion of the natural gas that was previously supplied to the EU by Russia is now being replaced by U.S. natural gas. If this is just a simple replacement, it doesn't have much significance in terms of energy transition.
Yang Lei: That substitution is indeed a short-term phenomenon. If you look at major hydrogen projects across the EU, those initiatives are partly intended to replace natural gas altogether. Moreover, thanks to supportive policies and economic factors, Europe's overall natural-gas consumption is now declining rather than being made up for by American imports.
High gas prices have certainly played a role, but the downward trend is already clear. In fact, new regulations—such as the Netherlands' prohibition on installing gas pipelines in new buildings—send an unmistakable signal that the transition is accelerating. Europe's falling gas demand has rattled global gas suppliers, since the EU has long been the world's largest gas market.
In the past, natural gas was widely regarded as clean energy with a bright future. But developments in Europe suggest that an era driven by gas is drawing to a close, and a new, market-led phase is beginning.
Caijing: Let’s talk about Trump. He has now withdrawn from the Paris Agreement for a second time. How do you think this withdrawal differs from his first one?
Yang Lei: The Republican Party has long held a skeptical view of climate change—back in 2001, shortly after taking office, President George W. Bush withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol. When Trump took office, he dismissed climate change as a "Chinese hoax."
Caijing: Early on, some here in China even joked that climate change was an "American hoax."
Yang Lei: It’s ridiculous. The Republican stance on climate change has deep roots, and Trump simply took it to a more extreme level. Of course, climate change is real, and we can feel it. If Trump insists on opposing climate change, it's somewhat ironic, because during his first term, the U.S. reduced emissions more than during Obama's single presidency. Obama even published a paper in the Journal Science proclaiming that the trend toward clean energy is irreversible.
But Trump's pragmatism is evident. His current approach is called "deregulation." Essentially, he's echoing a common saying in China: let the market play a decisive role (让市场发挥决定性作用). The Biden administration is pushing hard on renewable energy—Elon Musk is at the forefront of that movement with Tesla’s solar, storage, and electric vehicle businesses. Yet Musk has complained that Biden's policies are too cumbersome, and many clean-energy projects have sat in bureaucratic limbo for years. His frustrations with the approval process have been very public.
In fact, once the market is streamlined, renewables will thrive—thanks to rapid technological advances, their costs have already fallen below those of fossil fuels. Trump, as a businessman, understands this on a practical level. His slogan "drill, baby, drill" is not new; it dates back to the Bush era (2001–2008), roughly as the 2007 Republican campaign motto. After all, oil and gas have long been America's largest energy industries, and the GOP has deep ties to them.
Chinese state-owned oil companies have themselves reported that diesel consumption in China peaked two years ago, and gasoline consumption peaked last year. Going forward, oil demand will decline, and gas station revenues will shrink. China's trend is already contributing to a global peak in oil consumption. Consequently, oil and gas simply won't be as valuable as they once were.
I personally speculate that Trump's push to accelerate domestic oil and gas development is partly motivated by this reality: there's still money to be made—cash is king—so he wants to capture as much of Russia's and Saudi Arabia's market share as possible before the final wave of profits dries up. That way, the U.S. will be in a stronger position during the eventual transition. Many international oil and gas companies share a similar strategy: make profits now, then pivot to cleaner energy.
Caijing: This is the first time I've heard this perspective—that Trump clearly understands the renewable energy transition is unstoppable, but wants to seize the remaining fossil fuel dividends while he still can.
Yang Lei: I can't say whether Trump fully grasps the inevitability of the renewable transition. But I do think he embodies the philosophy of your book, "Energy Profiles of Various Countries" - that is, a belief in the market and deregulation. This way, the power unleashed by the market can be immense.
Caijing: During his second term, Trump explicitly emphasized developing fossil fuels, but his deregulation policies apply broadly across all energy sectors. Are you saying that deregulation can objectively benefit renewables as well?
Yang Lei: Yes, aside from his clear opposition to offshore wind, deregulation generally applies across the board. Excessive regulation disproportionately harms small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Big corporations have PR departments and resources to lobby for faster approvals for land, environmental issues, etc., while smaller firms struggle with these hurdles. The shale gas revolution in the U.S. was driven largely by SMEs, and many renewable energy companies today are SMEs as well. Simplifying regulation would clearly benefit these smaller players.
We've done some tracking studies. Some renewable energy projects in the U.S. have failed because of long waiting times—some projects are delayed by two years just to get approval.
Some of these delays are due to issues like grid access, land use, or environmental concerns. In China, projects typically are decided and launched within the same year. In the U.S., waiting in line for two years without starting construction is common. So from that standpoint, I actually think renewables stand to gain even more from deregulation.
Caijing: Very interesting. The logic that Trump, while advocating for fossil energy, might actually promote renewable energy development has persuaded me. This logic also applies to climate change: economic pragmatism is more effective than political correctness. Climate negotiations grow larger every year, yet progress remains limited.
Yang Lei: Over the past two years, I've had a strong feeling that climate summits, traditionally places for discussing ideals, are now more about business. The COP 28 in 2023 in Dubai attracted around 100,000 high-net-worth participants; in 2024, Baku hosted about 70,000. Professor Liu Qiao (刘俏), dean of Peking University's Guanghua School of Management, attended last year's Baku COP. When we held activities in China Pavilion, Some of Guanghua’s alumni entrepreneurs recognized their dean and gathered around him. I asked them what they were there for, and they said they were promoting renewable energy. With so many ministers and CEOs attending, it’s a prime opportunity to pitch projects. Some entrepreneurs had already booked return flights but, after discussing projects at the conference, rerouted to related countries to continue deeper talks.
Caijing: Leveraging business logic can better drive climate action.
Yang Lei: It’s about sustainability. We must identify viable business scenarios that generate sustainable commercial returns.
Caijing: Since Trump withdrew from the Paris Agreement, many have suggested that “China and Europe should join hands to push the climate agenda forward.” What do you think of this?
Yang Lei: This is a new development. With the pressure from the U.S., China and Europe have an objective need to get closer. We should actively strive for this, but it requires mutual willingness and will take time. China has only been opening its doors for development for a limited period, and trust takes time—between people, and between nations. As long as we adhere to the concept of building a community with a shared future for mankind—not only talking the talk, but also walking the walk—then whether it's advancing climate action or accelerating new energy development, now is an excellent time for deeper China–Europe cooperation.
By contributing to the world, fulfilling our responsibilities, and maintaining persistence, China's influence will grow. During my time at the International Energy Agency, I often felt this way. Differences of opinion are inevitable, but from the perspective of a community with a shared future, listening to diverse voices and seeking cooperation while respecting differences is far more beneficial to our common welfare than confrontation.
Caijing: Exactly—openness beats closure, cooperation beats conflict, peace beats war, and markets beat central planning.